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REINTERPRETING JURISPRUDENCE: THE
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND HOFFMAN V.
CAPITAL CITIES/ABC, INC.1
I. INTRODUCTION

In Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.,2 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution protected the use of actor Dustin Hoffman's image in an
article featured in Los Angeles Magazine (LAM).3 In so holding, the
court created questionable case precedent, which has led to
inconsistent jurisprudence.
In its March 1997 "Fabulous Hollywood Issue!," LAM featured
the GrandIllusions article which "used computer technology to alter
famous film stills to make it appear that the actors were wearing
Spring 1997 fashions. '4 The films and actors featured in the article
included, among others, John Travolta in Saturday Night Fever,
Marilyn Monroe in The Seven Year Itch, Cary Grant in North by
Northwest, and Dustin Hoffman in Tootsie.5
Dustin Hoffman, who "has scrupulously guided and guarded the
manner in which he has been shown to the public," never consented
to LAM's use of his image. 6 Nevertheless, LAM featured the altered
Tootsie photograph, which appeared much like the original, except
"Hoffman's body and his long-sleeved red sequined dress were
replaced by the body of a male model in the same pose.., in a...
gown by Richard Tyler and Ralph Lauren heels." '7 As a result,

1.
2.
3.
4.

255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).

Id.
Id. at 1189.
Id. at 1183.

5. Id.
6. Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867, 870-71
(C.D. Cal. 1999).
7. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1183.
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Hoffman sued LAM alleging 8a violation of his right of publicity in
his name, image, and likeness.
This case Comment begins by providing a brief legal
background of the relevant law regarding the right of publicity and
the First Amendment.
Next, this Comment summarizes and
critically analyzes the Ninth's Circuit's decision in Hoffinan v.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. Finally, this Comment concludes that the
Ninth Circuit's conclusion was unsound, its reasoning unpersuasive,
and, as a result, subsequent courts face the difficulty of
distinguishing or reinterpreting the court's decision.
II.BACKGROUND

A. Right of Publicityas a PropertyRight
"The right of publicity is the inherent right of every human
being to control the commercial use of his or her identity." 9 The
right of publicity protects the commercial interests that private
citizens and celebrities have in their identities. 10 A celebrity's
identity can be valuable in promoting products and therefore,
celebrities have an interest in preventing unauthorized commercial
exploitation of their identities." Therefore, the right of publicity has
"some social utility" in that it serves to protect those, primarily
celebrities, who expended "considerable money, time and energy" in
developing their own "skill, reputation, notoriety or virtues ...to
permit an economic
return through some medium of commercial
12
promotion."'

8. See id. Hoffman sued LAM for violations of his common law and
California's statutory right of publicity, and also alleged a violation of the
California unfair competition statute and the Federal Lanham Act. Id.
9. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR

§ 28:01 (4th ed. 2003).
10. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir.
1992).
11. See id.
12. Comedy III Prods. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804-05 (Cal.
2001) (quoting Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 834-35 (1979)
(Bird, C. J., dissenting)).
COMPETITION
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The right of publicity emerged from the laws of unfair
competition, misappropriation, fraud, and privacy. 13 However, that
right was first independently recognized in 1953 by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. 14 In Haelan Laboratories,Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 15 the Second Circuit held that baseball
players had the right to stop the unauthorized commercial use of their
likenesses and playing statistics on baseball cards. 16 The court
further expressed that individuals possess a property right in their
identities, which allows them to grant exclusive use of their identities
to one company in a specific market.17
Following the landmark decision in Haelan, many states began
recognizing the right of publicity as a distinct intellectual property
right. 18 Today, the right of publicity is widely recognized throughout
the country on both common law and statutory grounds. 19 Under
California state law, courts consider the right of publicity an
intellectual property right, the infringement of which is considered a
20
commercial tort of unfair competition.
California also provides a statutory remedy for the infringement
of the right of publicity and provides that:
Any person who knowingly uses another's name,...
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products,
merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or
selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise,
goods or services, without such person's prior consent...
shall be liable for any damages
sustained by the person...
21
injured as a result thereof.
The California statute is consistent with the underlying principle
that an individual's personality right or right of publicity is a

13. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY
§§ 1:3-4 (2d ed. 2003).
14. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868
(2d Cir. 1953).
15. Id.

16. Id. at 869.
17. Id. at 868-69.
18. See MCCARTHY, supranote 13, § 1:4.
19. Seeid. §§ 1:3-4.
20. See id. § 1:3.
21. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 2003).

88
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property right that deserves protection. 22 In particular, celebrities by
virtue of their time, effort, and labor invested a great deal to create
their famous and commercially valuable identities. 23 Accordingly,
the courts justifiably protect these rights because it prevents unjust
infringement by those who participate in deceptive trade practices
and false advertising to24benefit from the marketability of identities
that they did not create.
B. The Right of Publicity and the FirstAmendment

The right of publicity allows individuals and celebrities to
maintain exclusive control over their names and images. 25 Thus,
they may exclude others from using their names and images without
prior consent. 26 A tension therefore exists between the right of
publicity and the First Amendment. The First Amendment protects
freedom of speech. 7 The government's grant of the exclusive
property right to individuals in their identities often restrains, and
thus conflicts, with the public's arguable First Amendment right to
use the individual's name or image as part of their own expressive
messages.28 Defendants often argue that the right of publicity
violates their constitutional right to free speech by "inhibit[ing]
public debate and censor[ing] creative expressions., 2 9 Courts often
resolve this conflict between the right of publicity and free speech by
30
invoking the commercial speech doctrine.

22. See id.
23. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that White's identity is so famous that it carries
commercial value capable of marketing to advertisers); see also Winter v. DC
Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 478 (Cal. 2003) ("[T]he right of publicity holder
possesses... a right to prevent others from misappropriating the economic
value generated by the celebrity's fame.. ").
24. Chia Heng Ho, Note, Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 527, 530-31 (2002).
25. See White, 971 F.2d at 1399.
26. See id. at 1397 (Plaintiff alleged that defendant used her image in
violation of her exclusive property right in her own identity).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

28. See White, 971 F.2d at 1401 n.3.
29. Chia Heng Ho, supra note 24, at 532.
30. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 564-65
(1977).
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Commercial speech is generally defined as speech that "does no
more than propose a commercial transaction.",3 1 Commercial speech
is entitled to lesser First Amendment protection than noncommercial
speech.32 Nonetheless, commercial speech is entitled to some
protection as it "is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and
legitimate commercial information is unimpaired. 33 In order to
restrain speech in the context of right of publicity cases, if the speech
is classified as commercial, "a public figure plaintiff does not have to
show that the speaker [or defendant] acted with actual malice. 34
Accordingly, commercial speech is not entitled to absolute First
Amendment protection.3 ' The rationale justifying a lower threshold
of protection for artistic expression that depicts or imitates a celebrity
for commercial gain is based on the idea that such expression both
"directly trespass[es] on the right of publicity without adding
significant expression beyond that trespass, [and compromises] the
state law interest in protecting the fruits of artistic labor [which]
outweighs the expressive interests of the imitative artist.36
While courts grant commercial speech little First Amendment
protection, in contrast, "work[s] [that] contain significant
transformative elements... [are] especially worthy of... protection
[as they are] ... less likely to interfere with the economic interest

protected by the right of publicity., 37 This other class of speech,
"noncommercial speech," is often described as "communicative" or
"expressive." 38 Examples of expressive activities include movies,
books, magazine articles, political activities and the like. 39 Thus, an
expressive transaction may be capable of receiving economic

31. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1184 (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983)).
32. Id.
33. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
34. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185.
35. See id.
36. Comedy III Prods. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808
(Cal. 2001) (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562,
575-76).
37. Id.
38. See id. at 803.
39. See id. at 804.

90
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benefits even though courts will not necessarily consider the activity
commercial speech.40
In addition to engaging in non-commercial speech, another way
to receive broad First Amendment protection is if the publication or
work is of "public interest" and does not "contain knowing or
reckless falsehood., 41 "[T]he definition of 'public interest' sweeps
up any publication regarding public figures and celebrities, as well as
publications regarding private citizens who become associated with
some issue that has caught the public eye."42 The idea that the media
has a right to report on matters of legitimate public concern and
interest, regardless of an individual's right of publicity, was
43
confirmed in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.
However, the right to report is not absolute. The Court noted that the
right to report on issues of public interest must be balanced between
the individual's personal interest and the state's interest in providing
the publicity cause of action, on the one hand, and First Amendment
interests, on the other.44 Accordingly, although it is important to
prevent unjust enrichment and to promote and encourage creativity,
these interests must be balanced against the idea of chilling free
speech.45
III. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE FACTS

In Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 46 the plaintiff Dustin
Hoffman sued the defendant ABC, Inc., which owns LAM.47 Dustin
Hoffman is a successful motion picture actor who has a "strict policy
of not endorsing commercial products for fear that he will be
perceived in a negative light.., suggesting that his career is in
decline and that he no longer has the business opportunities or the

40. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).

41. Schuyler M. Moore, Putting the Brakes on the Right of Publicity, 9
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 45, 49 (2001).
42. Id. at 49-50 (citing Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254).
43. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
at 578.
44. Id.
45. See Alison P. Howard, A Fistful of Lawsuits: The Press, the First
Amendment, and Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 88 CAL. L. REv. 127, 16163 (2000).
46. 33 F. Supp. 2d 867 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
47. Id.
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box office draw as before. 4 8 In its March 1997 issue, LAM
published an article entitled Grand Illusions, which employed
computer technology to manipulate photographs of famous actors
it appear that they were wearing Spring 1997
and actresses to make
49
fashions.
designer
The GrandIllusions article contained a photograph of Hoffman
he
appeared in the 1982 movie Tootsie.50 The original movie still
as
depicted Hoffman in a red-sequined gown standing in front of the
American flag. 51 The computer-generated photograph in the LAM
article incorporated only Hoffman's head and the American flag, but
replaced Hoffman's body with a male model's body dressed in a
gown by Richard Tyler and shoes by Ralph Lauren. 52 LAM neither
to publish the digitally
sought nor obtained Hoffman's permission
53
magazine.
the
in
altered photograph
Hoffman sued ABC, the parent company of LAM, in California
state court alleging common law and statutory violations of the right
of publicity, violation of the state unfair competition statute, and the
Federal Lanham Act. 54 "ABC removed 55the case to federal court" and
"Hoffman added LAM as a defendant.,
A. DistrictCourtDecision
Hoffman succeeded at the district court level on all of his
56
The court found LAM's First Amendment defense
claims.
unavailing, explaining that LAM's use of Hoffman's name and
likeness was a commercial use, which enjoyed lower First
Amendment protection. 57 This commercial use met the elements
required to establish a right of publicity claim because it was

at 870.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.at 871.

54. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1183; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West
2003) (California right to publicity statute), CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200
(West 2003) (California unfair competition statute), Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §

1125(a) (2000).
55. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1183.
56. Hoffman, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 873-74.
57. Id.at 874-75.
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knowingly false, hence not protected by the First Amendment. 58
Furthermore, the district court determined that the "public interest"
defense did not apply because the case did not involve a "bona fide
59
and traditional news or public affairs report."
B. Summary of Ninth CircuitDecision
LAM appealed the district court's decision in favor of
Hoffman. 60 The Ninth Circuit reversed the ruling, holding that
LAM's publication of the GrandIllusions article, which contained
the Tootsie photograph, was not commercial speech. 6 1 The court
determined the photograph consisted of a combination of "fashion
photography, humor, and visual and verbal editorial comment on
classic files and famous actors. 62 Thus, the photograph was within
the purview of public interest and worthy of broad First Amendment
protection. 63 Furthermore, the court concluded that the magazine's
alteration of Hoffman's image did not constitute a knowing
falsehood because readers would know that the picture was digitally
altered.64
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Hoffman has led to much
controversy because it has resulted in-and it will continue to result
in-many inconsistent rulings.65 The court did not clearly articulate
a standard for "public interest," nor did it outline a test for
determining what constitutes "commercial speech., 66 As such, the
Ninth Circuit erred when it held that the First Amendment protected
the digitally altered photograph.67 The remainder of this Comment
will address the ill-reasoned analysis of the Ninth Circuit, as well as
the implications of this erroneous decision.

58. Id. at 875.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1183.

Id. at 1186.
Id. at 1185.
See id. at 1186.
See id.
at 1187-88.
65. See generally Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994 (9th Cir.
2001) (concluding that retailer's use of appellant's photograph was not entitled
to First Amendment protection).
66. See Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1180 (explaining the court's reasoning); see
also Moore, supra note 41, at 50 n.21.
67. Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1189.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. PublicInterest & Noncommercial Use

The court determined that LAM was "entitled to full First
Amendment protection awarded noncommercial speech., 68 This
holding is flawed in three important respects: (1) the article was
summarily classified as one of public interest; (2) the court
determined the digital alteration "was not a knowing falsehood
because reasonable readers would know from the context of the
article that the magazine had [created the alterations] by
computer;, 69 and (3) the court considered the article noncommercial
speech.
"The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment
provides an absolute defense to publication-based tort actions for
publications on matters of public interest, unless the publications
contain knowing or reckless falsehood., 70 While magazine articles,
books, and movies are often entitled to this protection,
advertisements are not.71 The Ninth Circuit in Hoffman qualified the
Grand Illusions article in LAM as one of public interest, but it did
not explain why. 72 The extent of the court's reasoning was that "the
article as a whole is a combination of fashion photography, humor,
and visual
and verbal editorial comment on classic films and famous
73
actors."

Some may argue that fashion, in and of itself, is a matter of
public interest. Others may argue that celebrities or entertainers are
subjects of public interest as "[w]e monitor their comings and
goings, their missteps and heartbreaks... copy their mannerisms,
74
their styles, their modes of conversation and of consumption."

68. Id.
69. Moore, supra note 41, at 50; see also Hoffmnan, 255 F.3d at 1184-88
(stating that the totality of the presentation of the article and the Tootsie
photograph did not convince the court that LAM's editors intended to falsely
suggest to readers that they were seeing Hoffrnan's body).
70. Moore, supra note 41, at 49.
71. See Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1184-86 (deciding LAM's alteration of the
Tootsie photograph is entitled to First Amendment protection).
72. See id.at 1180.
73. Id.at 1185.
74. Comedy III Prods. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001).
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In addition, often times the celebrity and fashion are combined
in one medium, and the bright-line distinction between matters of
public interest and pure advertisement becomes blurred. The
photographic depiction of Hoffman in the Richard Tyler evening
gown and Ralph Lauren shoes arguably contains some elements of
public interest, i.e. fashion and celebrity. 75 However, the photograph
also mirrors as an advertisement for Spring 1997 fashions as the
manufacturer, price, and availability of the items were described in
text immediately adjacent to the photograph.76 Thus, an important
issue arises because courts are forced to draw an arbitrary line
between what constitutes a per se advertisement and what is merely
an "editorial comment" on high fashion deserving of First
Amendment protection.
Assuming, arguendo, that an article depicting Dustin Hoffman in
high fashion is considered to be a matter of public interest, the Ninth
Circuit's decision not to find the article knowingly or recklessly false
is questionable.77 The digitally altered image was knowingly false as
it contained Hoffman's face, head, and the American flag from the
original movie still, but replaced Hoffman's body with one of a male
model dressed in designer fashions.78 Defendant LAM knew that
Hoffiman never wore the clothes that the image depicted him as
wearing, and that they used someone else's body in the picture.79
Moreover, the magazine "admitted that it intended to create the false
impression in the 80minds of the public 'that they were seeing Mr.
Hoffman's body.'
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the GrandIllusions article was
not knowingly false because the title page disclaimed that it digitally
altered the photographs. 8' The court also pointed to the Contributors
page, which indicated that LAM used the "latest in computer
82
software to give old movie stars makeovers for 'Grand Illusions.'
The court justified its decision by stating that, considering most of

75. See Hoffman, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 870.
76. See Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185.

77. See id. at 1188.

78. See Hoffman, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 870.

79. Id. at 875.
80. Id.
81. See Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1188.

82. Id.
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the actors featured in the article were deceased, it would be clear83that
"models' bodies were digitally substituted for the actors bodies."
Nevertheless, this reasoning is flawed because it suggests that if
a disclaimer appears on a false news report or in an inaccurate
portrayal in a book or magazine, it is still considered worthy of First
Amendment protection so long as it pertains to a matter of public
interest.
Additionally, some legal scholars have raised concerns about
legally classifying celebrities as subjects of public interest.8 4 If a
celebrity's photograph is considered to be a matter of public interest,
his image could be exploited without his consent. This exploitation
raises other First Amendment issues because it may chill the creation
of intellectual property, which is often comprised of speech.85
Celebrities would be reluctant to pose for promotional products, such
as movie stills, for fear that their images may be altered and immune
from attack. Furthermore, while a celebrity, such as Dustin
Hoffman, may wish to refrain from exploiting his image to maintain
the integrity of his craft, other third parties may exploit his image
under the
guise of public interest and become unjustly enriched
86
thereby.
Another troubling aspect of this decision was the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion that the digitally altered photograph of Dustin Hoffman
constituted noncommercial speech. 8 ' In an attempt to justify its
decision, the court pointed to other right of publicity cases where the
challenged use involved the appropriation of the celebrity's persona
in the context of an advertisement. 88 The court distinguished those
cases from Hoffman's because the Tootsie photograph was not

83. Id.
84. See id.
85. See Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the
Right of Publicity-FreeSpeech Interface,23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 471, 47980 (2003).
86. See Hoffman, 255 F.3dat 1180.
87. See Id. at 1186.
88. See id.
at 1185 (citing Newcombe v. Adolph Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686,
691 (9th Cir. 1998); Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 409 (9th
Cir. 1996); White v. Samsung Elecs. Am.Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir.
1992)).
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blatantly directed
to the sole purpose of selling designer fashions or
89
LAM
of
issues
Additionally, the Grand Illusions article was featured on the
cover of the magazine and in the table of contents to draw public
attention and promote the sale of the magazine. 90 The court reasoned
that "LAM did not use Hoffman's image in a traditional
advertisement printed merely for the purpose of selling a particular
product." 91 "Viewed in context, [the court found that] the article as a
whole is a combination of fashion photograph, humor, and visual and
92
verbal editorial comment on classic films and famous actors."
Thus, the court concluded that LAM's use of the image was not
commercial.93
Despite the court's decision to find the use noncommercial, the
Grand Illusions article and the Tootsie photograph appear to have
been featured in LAM primarily for the commercial purpose of
advertising. Of significance is the fact that the "shopping guide"
located towards the back of the magazine referenced the Grand
Illusions article and provided price and store information for the
clothing used in the Tootsie photograph.94 Thus, the clothing
depicted in the Tootsie photograph was tied directly to commercial
advertising.
If, in fact, the article was meant to provide editorial comment,
LAM should not have felt compelled to provide readers with
information about where to buy the clothing. 95 Moreover, it appears
that LAM sought not only to generate revenues through sales, but
also through the sale of advertisements. By featuring their clothing
in the article, LAM endorsed the related designers and attempted to
sell advertisements to these designers. 96 Accordingly, the Grand
Illusions article may be perceived as an "under-the-table arrangement
with actual or potential advertisers which would convert an apparent
97
news story into a paid advertisement."
89. See id.
90. See id.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Id.
at 1186.
See Hoffman, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 870.
See Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1188.

96. See Hoffman, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 870-71.

97. See Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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The Hoffman case is similar to Grant v. Esquire, Inc.,98 where
Esquire magazine used Cary Grant's modified image in its magazine
article without his consent. 99 However, the court in Grant found that
the magazine used the celebrity's image to attract attention to its
article and thus infringed on Grant's right of publicity.' 0 0 Similarly,
the Ninth Circuit should have followed the precedent of the Grant
court and upheld the district court's ruling because LAM did not ask
for Hoffman's authorization before using his image in its article." °"
Similar to Esquire magazine, LAM sought to exploit the images of
Illusions article without paying
the celebrities featured in the Grand
02
benefit."'
such
for
rate
going
"the
In a subsequent Ninth Circuit decision, the court conceded that
LAM's use had some commercial purpose. 10 3 Other aspects of the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Hoffinan are similarly problematic.
Assuming the Grand Illusions article and the Tootsie photograph
constitute a matter of public interest, the digitally altered photograph
was clearly a concerted false representation, which apparently was
remedied by placing disclaimers in the magazine.' 0 4 Taken together,
these factors should have been enough to support a decision not to
grant LAM "full First Amendment protection awarded [to]
noncommercial speech." 10 5 If the Ninth Circuit was adamant about
protecting LAM's use of the celebrity images within the Grand
Illusions article, the court should have supported its decision on
different grounds.
B. Transformative/FairUse
In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,106 the
California Supreme Court acknowledged that some commentators
98. Id.
99. See id. at 881.

100. See id. at 880-81.
101. SeeHoffinan,33 F. Supp.2dat871.
102. Grant, 367 F. Supp. at 883; see also Hoffman, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 872
(stating that defendant should have known that celebrities would demand
payment for the use of their names and likenesses).
103. See Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1002-03 n.2 (9th
Cir. 2001) (finding that "Abercrombie's use was much more commercial in
nature" than LAM's use).
104. SeeHoffman, 255 F.3d at 1187-88.
105. Id. at 1189.
106. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
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have proposed using the "fair use" defense from copyright law as an
affirmative defense in the right of publicity context. 107 The fair use
defense involves a balancing of four factors: "(1) the purpose and
character of the [copyrighted] use ... ; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the... substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.", 10 8

The California Supreme Court determined it inappropriate to
incorporate the entire fair use doctrine into right of publicity law. 109 .
The court indicated that two of the factors of the fair use defense,
"the nature of the copyrighted work" and "the amount and
substantiality of the portion used" would not be especially pertinent
to the determination of whether the "depiction of a celebrity likeness
'
is protected by the First Amendment."'
However, the California Supreme Court did indicate that the
first factor of the fair use defense, "the purpose and character of the
use," would be particularly useful in reconciling First Amendment
interests with the right of publicity."' This first factor asks whether
the use is "transformative" by adding a different character,
12
expression, or message to the original creation."
Like copyright law, right of publicity law seeks both to
encourage "free expression and creativity" and to protect the
"creative fruits of intellectual and artistic labor."' 13 When the
expression literally depicts the image of the celebrity, the state has an
114
interest in protecting the celebrity rather than the imitative artist.
However, if the work is transformative, it has significant expressive
elements and is more deserving of First Amendment protection as it
is also "less likely to interfere with the economic interest protected
15
by the right of publicity."

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See id. at 807.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
See Comedy II Prods., 21 P.3d at 807.
See id. at 807-08 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) & (3)).
See id. at 808.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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The purpose and character factor is inextricably entwined with
the factor which considers the amount and substantiality of the use of
the celebrity's likeness. 16 If the work is transformative, then usually
the "product containing [the] celebrity's likeness [will be considered]
so transformed that it... become[s] primarily the defendant's own
expression rather than the celebrity's likeness." 117 If the challenged
work is a literal depiction of the celebrity, it likely derives economic
value primarily from the celebrity depicted. Thus, it would be
considered an actionable right of publicity as the marketability and
economic value of the celebrity has been affected. 18 However, if
"the value of the work comes.., from the creativity, skill, and
reputation of the artist... it may be presumed that sufficient
transformative9 elements are present to warrant First Amendment
protection.""
Accordingly, when "faced with a right of publicity challenge to
his or her work ...[a defendant] may raise as an affirmative defense
that the work is protected by the First Amendment inasmuch as it
contains significant transformative elements or that the value of the
120
work does not derive primarily from the celebrity's fame."'
However, in Hoffman, the Ninth Circuit did not even apply the fair
use defense when deciding to grant LAM First Amendment
protection.121 Yet the court did allude
to the transformative nature of
22
the work in one subtle footnote.
The court in Hoffinan distinguished Comedy III on the ground
that the former contained "significant transformative elements" since
"Hoffman's body was eliminated and a new, differently clothed body
was substituted in its place."' 23 However, the court's reasoning is
flawed because the alterations in the Tootsie photograph are not
significant. Although a male model's body was used, the frame of
the body is nearly identical to Hoffnan's body as photographed in
the original movie still. 124 Moreover, the average reasonable reader
116. See id.
at 809.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See id.
Seeid. at810.
Id.
Id.at 797.

121. SeeHoffinan, 255 F.3d at 1184-89.
122. Id.at 1184n.2.
123. See id.
124. See id at 1187-88.
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would not notice that LAM replaced Hoffman's body with that of
another. Also, although Hoffman is in different clothing, a mere
enough to constitute a significant
change of dress is not
25
transformative element.'
Hence, it is the opinion of this author that LAM did not have a
valid defense for its unauthorized use of Dustin Hoffman's image,
celebrity, and likeness. For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit erred in
granting LAM First Amendment protection. Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit failed to clearly articulate the reasons for its holding. As a
result, subsequent courts have rendered inconsistent rulings and have
in ways which are not justified by
attempted to reinterpret the case
26
the Ninth Circuit's decision.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION

The Ninth Circuit rendered a flawed decision in Hoffman v.
Capital Cities,127 thus creating a burden for subsequent courts
attempting to either distinguish the case or follow its precedent. The
problematic nature of the Hoffman decision was first evidenced 2 in
8
another Ninth Circuit decision, Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch.1
In Downing, surfers sued Abercrombie & Fitch, a clothing
company, for publishing photographs of them and disclosing their
29
names without their authorization in Abercrombie's catalogue.'
Unlike the Hoffman decision, the Downing court 30used the correct
analysis and came to the exact opposite conclusion.'
In Downing, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the photographs
placed in the catalog did not "contribute significantly to a matter of
the public interest and that Abercrombie [could not] avail itself of the
First Amendment defense."' 31 Furthermore, the court deemed
125. See id. at 1184 n.2.

126. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (2002)

(referencing the Hoffnan decision in the context of the parody defense); see
also Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994 (2001) (interpreting the
Hoffman decision).
127. 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
128. See Downing, 265 F.3d at 1002 n.2.
129. See id.
at 999-1000.
130. See id.at 1001-10 (holding that illustrative use of the surfers'

photographs did not contribute significantly to a matter of public interest and
was not entitled to First Amendment protection).
131. Id.at 1002.
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Abercrombie's use commercial in nature, and, therefore, it was not
entitled to full First Amendment protection. 132 As in Downing, the
Ninth Circuit should have held in Hoffinan that LAM's use of
Hoffman's image constituted a mere "window-dressing to advance
the [magazine's] theme" of famous motion picture actors in designer
clothing.133 Thus, the court should have held that LAM's use of
Hoffman's image in its "Fabulous Hollywood Issue!" was not
entitled to the First Amendment protection since it did not contribute
significantly to public interest, but, rather, primarily advanced
magazine revenues.
The court distinguished the two cases on the grounds that
"Abercrombie, itself, used [the] images in its catalog to promote its
clothing, [while] L.A. Magazine was unconnected to and received no
consideration from the designer for the gown depicted in the
article.' 34 Although the Ninth Circuit made a valiant effort in
attempting to distinguish Hoffman, it failed to do so as LAM, itself,
used Hoffman's image in its magazine to draw the attention of the
public and designers so they could sell both magazines and
advertising space. Downing is but one example of the inconsistent
rulings that have resulted and that will continue to result as long as
Hoffman is considered good law.
Another consequence of the weak arguments set forth in
Hoffman is that courts will attempt to distinguish the case on any
basis they can conceptualize, even if such arguments are not
supported by the facts in the original case. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit
has even implicitly recognized the weaknesses of the logic in the
Hoffman case by later reinterpreting the decision to be based on the
parody defense, even though parody was never mentioned in the
35
original decision.'
The danger of this "reinterpreting" is evidenced in Mattel, Inc. v.
MCA Records, Inc.,13 6 where the Ninth Circuit decided an action
brought by toy manufacturer Mattel against music company MCA
for trademark infringement and dilution associated with the song

132. See id.
at 1002-03 n.2.
133. Id. at 1002; see also Hoffman, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 872.
134. Downing, 265 F.3d at 1002 n.2.
135. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
136. Id.
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"Barbie Girl" by the band Aqua.' 37 The Ninth Circuit held that
"Barbie Girl is not purely commercial speech, and is therefore fully
protected...

[as] ...

the song lampoons the Barbie image and

comments humorously on the cultural values Aqua claims she
represents."' 138 The court supported its decision by citing Hoffman
and conceded that the use of Hoffman's image "clearly served a
commercial purpose: 'to draw attention to the for-profit magazine in
which it appear[ed]' and to sell more copies.' 39
Although the Mattel case was correctly decided, the Ninth
Circuit erred in citing Hoffman as precedent for granting MCA First
Amendment protection based on the parody defense.' 40 LAM never
raised the parody defense, nor did the court discuss or allude to the
issue of parody. The fact that the same court reinterpreted its
decision, only one year later, speaks volumes about the flawed
Hoffman holding.
VI. CONCLUSION

Dustin Hoffman is a highly successful and recognizable actor.
To preserve his professional integrity, Dustin Hoffman has always
maintained that he will not commercialize his identity.' 4 1 LAM's
unauthorized use of Hoffman's image violated the actor's
professional ideal. LAM could have contracted other actors or
entertainers who have demonstrated their willingness to authorize the
use of their images instead of using the Tootsie photograph without
Hoffman's permission and without adequate compensation for the
photograph's benefits.
"There is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys
First Amendment protection. It is also true that entertainment itself
can be important news." 142 However, the Ninth Circuit erred in
finding that Los Angeles Magazine was entitled to broad First
Amendment protection because although Dustin Hoffman and
fashion may be considered matters of public interest, the digitally
altered photograph of the actor was false and misleading. Moreover,
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See id. at 899.
Id. at 906-07.
Id. at 906.
See id.
See id. at 870.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977).
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the magazine article constituted commercial speech, which should be
granted only limited First Amendment protection because the article
did not contain significant transformative elements. The Ninth
Circuit's erroneous decision has resulted in-and will continue to
result in-inconsistent jurisprudence unless and until the court
explicitly recognizes its flawed reasoning and inaccurate decision.
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